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HUNT V. KENAI PENINSULA
BOROUGH: THE SEARCH FOR
CLARITY IN LEGISLATIVE PRAYER
SPEAKER SELECTION
Charles Truslow & Craig Jones*
ABSTRACT
In 2016, three residents of the Kenai Peninsula Borough were prevented from
delivering an invocation at a Borough Assembly meeting because they were
neither borough chaplains nor members of a qualifying religious association.
These three residents sued the borough, claiming that the Borough Assembly’s
speaker selection policy violated the Alaska Constitution’s Establishment
Clause. The superior court ruled for the plaintiffs, holding that the selection
policy constituted a step towards the establishment of a state religion. Applying
Supreme Court precedent, the superior court reached the correct result.
However, the limited amount of federal precedent on the principles guiding
speaker selection policies has led to significant variance of application in
different jurisdictions. Important questions remain regarding the scope of
legislative prayer doctrine in Alaska, which still need to be addressed.

I. INTRODUCTION
In 2016, the Kenai Peninsula Borough Assembly (the Assembly)
instituted a policy partially restricting who could deliver the Assembly’s
invocation.1 Three plaintiffs who were prevented from delivering an
invocation sued, arguing that the policy violated Alaska’s religious
establishment clause.2 The superior court ruled for the plaintiffs, finding
the Assembly’s policy “stemmed from intolerance for the controversial
Copyright © 2019 by Charles Truslow and Craig Jones.
* Charles Truslow: J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2020;
B.A. History and Philosophy, Augsburg University, 2013. Craig Jones: J.D.
Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2020; B.A. Political Science and
French, University of Tennessee-Knoxville, 2016.
1. Hunt v. Kenai Borough Peninsula, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 3 (Alaska
Super. Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with author). The case was decided by Judge
Andrew Peterson, who was appointed to the Third Judicial District in 2018. Alaska
Judges, Alaska Court System, http://courts.alaska.gov/judges/ (last visited Mar.
25, 2019).
2. Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 4.

36.1 TRUSLOW-JONES FINAL (DO NOT DELETE)

120

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

5/20/2019 2:00 PM

Vol. 36:1

views expressed during two particular invocations.”3 Interpreting
Bonjour v. Bonjour,4 and subsequent Supreme Court cases, the superior
court concluded that Alaska’s Establishment Clause need not be
interpreted more broadly than the federal Establishment Clause.5
Therefore, the court applied the only two cases the Supreme Court has
decided on the issue of legislative prayer:6 Marsh v. Chambers7 and Town
of Greece v. Galloway.8 The Hunt court was largely successful in doing so
but failed to fully clarify important points regarding religious affiliation,
the scope of discrimination, and first amendment principles.
This Comment provides a brief survey of notable interpretative
approaches to Marsh and Greece in order to critique the approach in Hunt.
Part II describes the important facts and holdings of the Hunt case. Part
III discusses the legal background of Marsh, Greece, and other important
legislative prayer cases. Finally, Part IV contrasts the approach in Hunt
to that of other legislative prayer cases discussed in Part III. We conclude
by reiterating the importance of further clarification on the issue of
legislative prayer in Alaska.

II. HUNT V. KENAI BOROUGH PENINSULA
In 2016, the Assembly adopted a “first come, first served” practice,
in order to expand the pool of invocation speakers.9 This resulted in two
controversial invocations, one of which ended with the phrase “Hail
Satan,” which in turn created further complaints.10
To address the complaints, the Assembly introduced a speaker
selection policy which became the subject of the Hunt case:11
To ensure that [] (the “invocation speaker”) is selected from
among a wide pool of representatives . . . :
The Clerk shall post a notice on the borough internet home page
that all religious associations with an established presence in the
Kenai Peninsula Borough that regularly meet for the primary
purpose of sharing a religious perspective, or chaplains who
may serve one of [sic] more of the fire departments, law
enforcement agencies, hospitals, or other similar organizations
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 18.
Bonjour v. Bonjour, 592 P.2d 1233, 1236 n.3 (Alaska 1979).
Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 9.
Id.
463 U.S. 783 (1983).
572 U.S. 565 (2014).
Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 3.
Id.
Id. at 4.
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in the borough, are eligible to provide invocations to the
assembly, and that the authorized leader of any such association
or chaplain can submit a written request to provide an
invocation to the borough clerk.12
After the adoption of the resolution, three borough residents sought to
provide an invocation, but their requests were rejected as they were not
members of a qualifying religious association or borough chaplains.13
Lance Hunt was an atheist, Iris Fontana was a twenty-seven year old
Kenai Peninsula College student and member of the Satanic Temple,14
and Elise Boyer was Jewish.15
In response to their rejection, the three sued the Assembly, alleging,
amongst other claims, that the Assembly’s policy violated the Alaska
Constitution’s establishment clause.16 Alaska’s establishment clause
provides that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion.”17 Noting that the Alaska Supreme Court has not addressed the
issue of legislative prayer under Alaska’s establishment clause, the
superior court relied exclusively on federal law and limited its inquiry to
the narrow issue of whether the requirements in the Assembly’s policy
constitute an impermissible establishment of religion.18
The court explained that the establishment clause “not only
prohibit[s] the establishment of a state religion, it prohibits laws that act
as a step towards the establishment of a state religion.”19 The Hunt court
determined that the Assembly’s policy “excludes minority faiths from
participating in the invocation practice.”20 The court further reasoned
that “[t]he goal behind legislative invocations . . . is the idea that people
of many faiths may be united in a community of tolerance and

12. Id.
13. Id. All three members were denied for not belonging to a “qualifying
religious association” as defined under the policy. Id. No further definition for
“established presence” or “regularly meet” is established in Hunt.
14. Daysha Eaton, Kenai Assembly Considers Moment of Silence After Satanic
Prayer, Protest, Counter-Protest, ALASKA PUBLIC MEDIA (Aug. 23, 2016),
https://www.alaskapublic.org/2016/08/23/kenai-assembly-considersmoment-of-silence-after-satanic-prayer-protest-counter-protest/.
15. Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 4.
16. Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 5–6.
17. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 4. The relevant portion of the federal
Establishment Clause is identical. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
18. See Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 7–8.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Id. at 17.
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devotion.”21 The court found the Assembly’s policy was contrary to this
goal, as it stemmed from intolerance of certain controversial views.22
Finally, the court impliedly provided a rule outlining what future
behavior assemblies may engage in. The court stated that after “opening
the invocation opportunity to all residents, [the assembly] cannot then put
in place requirements that in effect exclude minority faiths or beliefs.”23
The court stated that the Assembly “has made clear that the resolution
stemmed from intolerance for the controversial views expressed during
two particular invocations.”24 Furthermore, the court held that the
establishment clause only allows the prevention of an invocation speaker
“where [the speaker has] exploited the invocation opportunity to
proselytize, advance, or disparage any faith or belief.”25
Ruling for the Plaintiffs, the court concluded that the invocation
policy adopted by the Assembly was not inclusive enough under Greece,
where “no faith was excluded by law, nor any favored.”26

III. LEGISLATIVE PRAYER IN ALASKA: MARSH, GREECE AND THEIR
PROGENY
A. Alaska’s Legislative Prayer Tradition
Legislative prayer has been a routine practice of Alaskan legislatures
since the first session of the Alaska Constitutional Convention which
opened with an invocation by Reverend Roy Ahmogak.27 He prayed,
“[e]nlighten [the delegates] with wisdom from above and especially in
establishing our Constitution.”28 Today, both houses of the Alaska
Legislature open their sessions with prayer.29 However, local practices
differ across the state,30 and these practices have occasionally prompted
controversy. An invocation was officially adopted as a standing item on
21. Id. (citing Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 134 S. Ct. 1811
(2014)).
22. Id. at 18.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 16.
27. Proceedings of the Alaska Constitutional Convention [hereinafter PACC],
at 594, available at http://www.akleg.gov/pdf/billfiles/Constitutional
Convention/Proceedings/Proceedings%20-%20Complete.pdf.
28. Id.
29. See, e.g., H.R. 29-2015-01-20, 1st Sess., at 2 (Alaska 2015).
30. For instance, the Anchorage Assembly does not typically begin their
meetings with prayer. See, e.g., MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, ASSEMBLY AGENDA
(Jan. 29, 2019), http://anchorageak.granicus.com/DocumentViewer.php?file=
anchorageak_8c975b90c15359e11fc4eebcfcfb6e32.pdf&view=1.
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the Fairbanks North Star Borough Assembly agenda in 2001.31 Before
that, invocations were traditionally offered, but not officially a part of the
agenda.32 In 2017, a proposal to remove the invocation from the
Assembly’s agenda failed by one vote after hours of testimony and debate
over the role of religion in civic life and the freedom of individuals to
express their religion publicly.33 It is worth bearing in mind that while
legislative prayer has a long history in Alaska, it has prompted discord at
times.
B. Supreme Court Jurisprudence: Legislative Prayer & the
Establishment Clause
The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of legislative prayer
twice. First, in Marsh, the court held Nebraska’s legislative prayer
practice to be constitutional.34 Nebraska’s legislature opened their
sessions with a prayer by a state employed chaplain, chosen with
legislative approval.35 Chief Justice Burger observed that over time “the
practice of opening legislative sessions with prayer has become a part of
the fabric of our society.”36 Thirty years later, the court tackled the
question of prayer at local government meetings in Greece, finding that
the town of Greece’s practice of opening its council meetings with
invocations by local clergy was consistent with the Establishment
Clause.37 Marsh and Greece have collectively established that sectarian
legislative prayer is constitutional at all levels of government. However,
these cases leave important practical matters unresolved.
One key open question is: who is required to have the opportunity to
deliver an invocation? The issue of speaker selection took a backseat in
both Marsh and Greece to other pressing issues like whether legislative
prayer is constitutional at all and whether it is required to be nonsectarian.
The Nebraska Legislature employed the same Presbyterian minister to

31. Amanda Bohman, Local Issue Breakdown: Should the Borough Nix its
Invocation?, FAIRBANKS NEWS-MINER (Apr. 6, 2017), http://www.newsminer.com
/news/local_news/local-issue-breakdown-should-the-borough-assembly-nixits-invocation/article_f5d8e848-1aa2-11e7-b2e7-af395b5bf773.html (citing local
history research performed by Borough Clerk Nanci Ashford-Bingham).
32. Id.
33. Amanda Bohman, Borough Assembly Votes to Keep Prayer at Meetings,
FAIRBANKS NEWS-MINER (Apr. 14, 2017), http://www.newsminer.com/news/
local_news/borough-assembly-votes-to-keep-prayer-at-meetings/article_
f60a5e36-20ed-11e7-86a8-4b32b8f52fc0.html.
34. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
35. Id. at 784.
36. Id. at 792.
37. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 570.
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deliver invocations for sixteen years.38 In Marsh, the Court accepted this
practice because in their estimation, the chaplain’s long tenure reflected
his “performance and personal qualities” rather than “an impermissible
motive.”39 While that phrase is not defined specifically, the Court
suggested that the advancement of one religion would be an
“impermissible motive.”40
In Greece, the Court faced a more complicated issue of speaker
selection. The town had traditionally solicited volunteers to give the
invocation by calling local congregations (almost all of which were
Christian) listed in the phone book.41 When this practice prompted
complaints from non-Christian citizens, the town allowed a Jewish
layman, the chairman of the local Baha’i temple, and a Wiccan priestess
to deliver invocations after they requested the council’s permission.42 The
Court found this speaker selection regime acceptable, summarizing its
holding as follows:
The town made reasonable efforts to identify all of the
congregations located within its borders and represented that it
would welcome a prayer by any minister or layman who wished
to give one . . . So long as the town maintains a policy of
nondiscrimination, the Constitution does not require it to search
beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer givers in an effort to
achieve religious balancing.43
This is the clearest statement from the Supreme Court directly addressing
the selection of speakers in legislative prayer. The standard the Court
chose places enormous weight on whether a speaker selection policy is
discriminatory, without much guidance as to where that line should be
drawn. However, First Amendment jurisprudence from other contexts
sheds light on how the nondiscrimination principle should be applied.
1. The Distinct Doctrines of Legislative Prayer
The Supreme Court has emphasized that because of the long history
and tradition of legislative prayer, it merits different treatment from other
Establishment Clause contexts.44 It is true that the Marsh court declined

38. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 571.
42. Id. at 572.
43. Id. at 585–86 (emphasis added).
44. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (“In this context, historical evidence sheds light
not only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but
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to apply long standing Establishment Clause precedent, including Lemon
v. Kurtzman.45 But the Court has not squarely held that this history
entirely severs the legislative prayer context from traditional
Establishment Clause doctrine.46
It is impractical to hermetically seal legislative prayer, isolating it
from the broader context of First Amendment jurisprudence, for several
reasons. First, Marsh and Greece explicitly call on courts to make a fact
specific inquiry into each prayer opportunity.47 More importantly, the
standards set forth in those two cases are insufficiently precise to
workably govern the broad range of issues raised by fact specific analyses
of the many varied legislative practices. Addressing these issues by
creating special, separate doctrines for the legislative prayer arena would
be inconsistent and possibly confusing. Further, treating legislative
prayer like an island cut off from the rest of the First Amendment is
counterproductive because it deprives this specific context of insights
gained over decades spent interpreting the contours of the Establishment
Clause. Rather than creating new standards from whole cloth, it is
appropriate to seek guidance from other religious clause precedents to
illuminate the impermissible motive and nondiscrimination standards of
Marsh and Greece. Two doctrines that would be especially helpful to
incorporate are: the prevention of religious gerrymanders, and the
prohibition on discriminating between denominations.
2. Facially Neutral Discrimination
Over the years, the Supreme Court has developed religious clause
principles that could be useful in fortifying Greece’s “nondiscrimination”
requirement. Legislative prayer jurisprudence should acknowledge the
problem of religious gerrymandering, whereby facially neutral policies
are crafted to exclude disfavored religious views.48 Otherwise, local
governments will be able to skirt the requirements of Marsh and Greece by
enacting ostensibly neutral policies that exclude controversial invocation
speakers. The Supreme Court has already addressed this problem in
other Establishment Clause contexts.
also on how they thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the
First Congress—their actions reveal their intent.”).
45. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
46. See Greece, 572 U.S. at 576 (“Yet Marsh must not be understood as
permitting a practice that would amount to a constitutional violation if not for its
historical foundation.”).
47. Id. at 587 (“The inquiry remains a fact-sensitive one that considers both
the setting in which the prayer arises and the audience to whom it is directed.”).
48. See Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 695 (1970) (identifying the
problem of religious gerrymandering).
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In Gillette v. United States,49 Justice Marshall clearly rejected a facial
neutrality standard: “The question of governmental neutrality is not
concluded by the observation that [the statute] on its face makes no
discrimination between religions, for the Establishment Clause forbids
subtle departures from neutrality, ‘religious gerrymanders,’ as well as
obvious abuses.”50
The Supreme Court addressed facial neutrality again in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah.51 There, the city had drafted
vastly underinclusive ordinances to prevent practitioners of Santeria from
performing animal sacrifices, relying on a pretextual public health
justification.52 Justice Kennedy pointed out that the law applied to
essentially no other form of animal slaughter besides Santeria because
exceptions to the rule were tailored to allow other practices and
slaughterhouse businesses.53 He found the city’s actions preceding its
passage of the ordinances evidenced its hostility toward Santeria.54
Justice Kennedy pulled away the veil of facial neutrality, finding that the
anti-slaughter laws were not neutral with respect to religion because they
were motivated by distaste for Santeria.55 In striking them down, he
wrote, “the Free Exercise Clause protects against government hostility
which is masked, as well as overt.”56
The Supreme Court has also condemned discrimination between
religious denominations. In Larson v. Valente,57 the Supreme Court
declared “[t]he clearest command of the Establishment Clause is that one
religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another.”58
There, the state exempted religious organizations from certain
registration requirements if they got more than half of their funding
through charitable donations.59 The law did not specify religions or
denominations to which it would apply, for instance by differentiating
between Protestants and Catholics; instead, the law set a standard that the
legislature thought would provide consumer protection from fraudulent
charitable solicitations.60 Nevertheless, the Court struck down the

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

401 U.S. 437 (1971).
Id. at 452 (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 696).
508 U.S. 520 (1993).
Id. at 547.
Id. at 545.
Id. at 541.
Id. at 542.
Id. at 534.
456 U.S. 228 (1982).
Id. at 244.
Id. at 230.
Id. at 231–32.
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distinction because it had the effect of imposing requirements on some
religious denominations, but not others.61
The Marsh Court did not apply Larson to Nebraska’s choice of
clergy.62 Justice Brennan pointed out that Larson, decided shortly before
Marsh, would have been an apt precedent saying, “I have little doubt that
the Nebraska practice, at least, would fail the Larson test.”63 However, in
Greece, the Court expanded on Marsh by incorporating a requirement of
nondiscrimination in speaker selection.64 This new doctrine implicates
Larson because discrimination between denominations is a concrete
example of unconstitutional religious discrimination. Though Brennan
was dissenting in Marsh, his observation could offer insight into how
courts should apply the Greece nondiscrimination principle.
“Nondiscrimination” calls out for a workable definition, so precedents
like Larson and Lukumi Babalu Aye that apply nondiscrimination principles
in the religious context seem to be the most logical place to look for clarity.
The Fourth Circuit, at least, saw value in this approach when citing Larson
in a recent legislative prayer decision.65
3. Lower Court Decisions Post-Greece
Federal courts have interpreted Greece’s mandates in myriad and at
times directly contradictory ways. The inconsistency of these lower court
decisions reflects the need for clarification of Greece’s standards through
the application of existing Establishment Clause principles. In Bormuth v.
County of Jackson, the Sixth Circuit upheld a county commission’s practice
of having the commissioners themselves offer invocations on a rotating
basis.66 They relied heavily on facial neutrality:
The Board’s invocation practice is facially neutral regarding
religion. On a rotating basis, each elected Jackson County
Commissioner, regardless of his religion (or lack thereof), is
afforded an opportunity to open a session with a short
invocation based on the dictates of his own conscience. Neither
other Commissioners, nor the Board as a whole, review or
approve the content of the invocations. There is no evidence that
the Board adopted this practice with any discriminatory intent.67

61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 255.
Marsh, 463 U.S. at 795.
Id. at 801 n.11 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at 585–86.
Lund v. Rowan County, 863 F.3d 268, 280 (4th Cir. 2017).
Bormuth v. County of Jackson, 870 F.3d 494, 498 (6th Cir. 2017).
Id. at 498.
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The court interpreted the nondiscrimination mandate to bar
discriminatory intent and censorship, but expressly held that the county
was not required to seek out prayers from individuals of other faiths.68
That someone of a different faith could be elected to the county
commission and offer an invocation satisfied the Bormuth court’s standard
of nondiscrimination. This reasoning is in tension with Greece’s
nondiscrimination policy and seems to stop at facial neutrality when
Larson and Lukumi Babalu Aye appear to require more.
The Fourth Circuit reviewed a strikingly similar case, where county
commissioners offered prayers to begin meetings.69 Contrary to the Sixth
Circuit’s approach, the court found that limiting the class of prayer givers
to commissioners was inconsistent with Greece.70 Though the court’s
opinion focused heavily on the risk of politicizing religious faith, it also
observed that, “instead of embracing religious pluralism and the
possibility of a correspondingly diverse invocation practice, Rowan
County’s commissioners created a ‘closed-universe’ of prayer-givers
dependent solely on election outcomes.”71 The court also found that “a
tapestry of many faiths” represented in the invocation practice would
lessen the appearance that the county has aligned itself with any one
religion.72 These completely opposing approaches to speaker selection
demonstrate the need for a cleaner definition of nondiscrimination.
Federal district courts have also taken on speaker selection issues.
For instance, the Middle District of Florida struck down Brevard County’s
practice of barring nontheists from giving invocations.73 The Middle
District of Pennsylvania reached the same conclusion when it examined
the state House of Representatives’ invocation practice, saying: “[t]he
House’s selection process invites members of the public to serve as guest
chaplains but draws a qualifying line of demarcation between theistic and
nontheistic belief systems. This is a horse of a different color from prayer
practices previously found to be consistent with history and tradition.”74
These courts took a broad view of Greece’s nondiscrimination mandate,
suggesting that the prayer opportunity must be offered to citizens with a
wide range of beliefs.
68. See id. at 514 (“Marsh and Town of Greece do not require Jackson County to
provide opportunities for persons of other faiths to offer invocations.”).
69. Lund, 863 F.3d at 272.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 282 (quoting Lund v. Rowan Cty., 103 F. Supp. 3d 712, 723 (M.D.N.C.
2015)).
72. Id. at 284.
73. Williamson v. Brevard County, 276 F. Supp. 3d 1260, 1283–84 (M.D. Fla.
2017).
74. Fields v. Speaker of Pennsylvania House of Representatives, 327 F. Supp.
3d 748, 757 (M.D. Pa. 2018).
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By contrast, the Eastern District of Tennessee found no constitutional
problem with a county commission’s regime limiting the opportunity to
give an invocation to “eligible member[s] of the clergy.”75 In support of
its holding that religion may be favored over non-religion, the court
emphasized that the legislative prayer context is distinct from the main
line of Establishment Clause jurisprudence because of its unique history.76
Flowing from this premise the court found that “while legislative bodies
cannot intentionally discriminate against particular faith systems, they
can require that invocation givers have some religious credentials.”77
These wildly disparate interpretations of Marsh and Greece suggest that
the standards set forth in those cases are vague enough to act as Rorschach
tests for lower courts.

IV. THE HUNT COURT’S STRENGTHS AND POINTS FOR
IMPROVEMENT
This analysis begins by highlighting the strengths of the Hunt
opinion. We then examine some of the important similarities and
differences between Hunt and other lower court opinions. Finally, we
conclude by examining some of the important remaining challenges left
for Alaska courts to examine.
The Hunt court was largely successful in applying the limited
Supreme Court precedent, to create a set of boundaries to assess the
Assembly’s policy. The Hunt court accurately tracked the language and
spirit of Greece by citing the purpose of legislative prayer to be one of
uniting people of many faiths in “a community of tolerance and
devotion.”78 And it emphasized the importance that Marsh and Greece
placed on invocations being before “adults not readily susceptible to
religious indoctrination.”79 Perhaps most importantly, in striking down
the Assembly’s policy, the court applied the holding established in Greece
that sectarian invocations are constitutional only if “a policy of
nondiscrimination is maintained.”80 Indeed, the Assembly’s requirement
that interested candidates be a member of a “religious association[] with
an established presence” that “regularly meet[s]” seems to be precisely
tailored to discriminate against atheism and minority faiths.81
75.
76.
77.
78.
Super.
566).
79.
80.
81.

Coleman v. Hamilton County, 104 F. Supp. 3d 877, 880 (E.D. Tenn. 2015).
Id. at 889–90.
Id. at 890.
Hunt v. Kenai Borough Peninsula, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 17 (Alaska
Ct. Oct. 9, 2018) (on file with author) (quoting Town of Greece, 572 U.S. at
Id. at 13.
Id. at 3.
Id. at 5.
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The Hunt court’s reasoning is in some ways consistent with at least
one federal case involving strikingly similar facts. In Coleman, the Eastern
District of Tennessee found Hamilton County’s prayer policy to be within
the confines of Marsh and Greece despite the County’s requirement that
members be a part of a “religious congregation[] with an established
presence in Hamilton County.”82 The court upheld the policy because the
plaintiff failed to provide any evidence of intentional or unintentional
discrimination against “particular faith systems.”83 In both Coleman and
Hunt, great emphasis was placed on the importance of discrimination
against certain faiths, which explains the different results between the two
cases. The Hunt court held that the purpose of the Assembly’s policy was
to exclude controversial minority faiths without one of the valid Greece
purposes.84 This decision is consistent with Greece, which favors the
inclusion of various faiths provided that their members not take the
invocation opportunity to advance their own, or disparage another’s,
belief system.85
However, Coleman identifies an important gap in the Hunt court’s
reasoning. In Coleman, the plaintiff claimed not to represent any
particular faith, and the court held that the Establishment Clause does not
prohibit requiring that an individual “have some religious credentials.”86
In Hunt, one of the plaintiffs, Lance Hunt, identified as an atheist.87 While
the Hunt court acknowledged that the Assembly’s policy discriminated
against disfavored religious groups,88 it neglected to address whether the
exclusion of an atheist violates this principle. The reasoning in Coleman,
and even Hunt’s own reasoning, seem to interpret Greece as requiring the
inclusion of diverse faiths.89 Neither decision interprets Greece as
requiring the inclusion of any person who wishes to provide an
invocation.
Another point which lacks clarification in Hunt was exemplified in
Bormuth. There, the Sixth Circuit was satisfied that the standards of Marsh
and Greece were met because the policy at issue was not discriminatory
on its face.90 In contrast, though the Hunt court did not explicitly address
the issue of implicit or facial discrimination, the court’s reasoning implies
82.
2015).
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
16–17.
90.

Coleman v. Hamilton County, 104 F. Supp. 3d 877, 880, 890 (E.D. Tenn.
Id. at 890.
Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 17–18.
Id. at 16–17.
104 F. Supp. 3d, at 881, 890.
Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at 5 n.4.
Id. at 16–17.
See, e.g., Coleman, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 890; Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI, at
Bormuth, 870 F.3d at 514.
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that either would be sufficient to violate Alaska’s Establishment Clause.91
The Assembly’s policy was not discriminatory on its face, but the Hunt
court pointed to extrinsic evidence, such as the Assembly’s own
statements, which demonstrated the discriminatory nature of the
Assembly’s policy. Establishing this outright would provide helpful
guidance for future decisions.
Hunt also usefully demonstrates that the intensely fact specific
nature of a legislative prayer inquiry requires tailoring the nondiscrimination principle’s application to the nature of the locale.
Legislative prayer inquiries involve an examination of the way a
legislative body’s speaker selection policy interacts with the local
community’s demographic makeup, geography, and culture. The Greece
court was clear that local governments do not have to look outside their
borders to create religious balancing, but must maintain a policy of
nondiscrimination within their borders.92 Because every locality is
different, a policy that fosters nondiscrimination in one place might result
in discrimination if it were applied elsewhere. A comparison of the
speaker selection policies examined in Hunt and Coleman vividly
illustrates this phenomenon. They both required affiliation with a faith
group that had an established presence in the community. However,
Hamilton County has a population of about 361,500 people distributed
over around 542 square miles (roughly 620 people per square mile).93
And Kenai Peninsula Borough has a population of about 58,600 people
and a land area of about 16,075 square miles (roughly 3.5 people per
square mile).94 This drastic difference in density is significant when
considering a speaker selection policy that requires an established
presence in the community. Where people are more concentrated, it is
easier for them to create established presences. Where people are more
dispersed, a policy that requires an institutional presence creates a greater
risk of discrimination against minority faiths.
The superior court’s decision in Hunt also implicitly acknowledges
important First Amendment principles from outside Marsh and Greece:
avoidance of religious gerrymanders and facially neutral discrimination
between denominations. The superior court in Hunt struck down the
speaker selection policy because it found from the record that 1) some
91. See Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 17–18.
92. 572 U.S. at 585–86.
93. QuickFacts Hamilton County, Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 1, 2017),
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/hamiltoncountytennessee,US/
PST045217 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
94. QuickFacts Kenai Peninsula Borough, Alaska, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Jul. 1,
2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/kenaipeninsula
boroughalaska/PST045217 (last visited Mar. 7, 2019).
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prior invocations had been controversial, 2) that the speaker selection
policy was created in response to this controversy, and 3) the purpose of
the policy was to prevent future invocations of a similar nature.95 This
describes exactly the kind of reasoning the U.S. Supreme Court applied
to bar a facially neutral religious gerrymander in Church of the Lukumi
Babalu Aye. In the future, courts should flesh out this implicit
acknowledgement to create a workable doctrine regarding speaker
selection. Importing the prohibitions on religious gerrymanders and
discrimination between denominations to the island of legislative prayer
jurisprudence would clarify the doctrine of speaker selection. These
independently established principles could mitigate the scattershot
interpretations lower courts have placed on the mandates of Marsh and
Greece.

V. CONCLUSION
In Hunt the superior court interpreted Marsh and Greece to strike
down an invocation speaker selection policy that was tailored to exclude
disfavored beliefs. The case and its circumstances offer a demonstration
of how murky the directives of Marsh and Greece can be in practice. Trial
courts are called upon to interpret broad questions of intent and decide
what kinds of policies are discriminatory without much direction. For
this reason, it is important for courts to consult other cornerstone
establishment clause nondiscrimination principles to clarify legislative
prayer doctrine. Though each case will remain highly fact specific,
consistently applicable principles should be developed.

95. Hunt, No. 3AN-16-10652 CI at 17–18.

